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KILPATRICK'S RAID &
MINTY'S CAVALRY CHARGE
Sherman decided to make another run at the Macon and Western
Railroad in August 1864, sending Kilpatrick's Third Division
of cavalry, reinforced with two brigades of Garrard's Second
Division, totaling 4,500 men. Kilpatrick drove a force of
Confederate cavalry through Jonesboro, where the Union
troops destroyed the railroad tracks, stores, and warehouses
full of cotton. The Confederates guessed correctly that the
next day Kilpatrick would attempt to destroy the railroad at
another point south of Jonesboro, and sent Reynolds Arkansas
Brigade to Lovejoy's Station by railcar. Kilpatrick's
cavalry proceeded from Jonesboro southeast about six miles
in the direction of McDonough, then turned to the southwest
to strike the railroad about one mile north of Lovejoy's (Scaife
1993:120-121). This advance was along the road
from Lee's Mill to Lovejoy's Station that joined the current
McDonough Road in the vicinity of the Nash Farm property.
Kilpatrick's plan was to dismantle a large section of the
railroad, then continue west to the Chattahoochee, where
they would cross and rejoin the Union Lines.
Garrard's First and Second Brigades, under Colonel Robert Minty and Colonel Eli Long and supported by the Chicago Board of Trade Battery, were leading the way toward the railroad at Lovejoy's. When the cavalry had gotten just past Nash Farm, they came to the intersection of the current McDonough Road, with the old Fosterville Road, where the Stephen G. Dorsey house stood. The Fosterville Road ran east-west. To the west, the road crossed the Macon and Western Railroad about a mile north of the station at Lovejoy's; to the east, the road followed the south side of Walnut Creek, before rejoining the McDonough Road to the east of Nash Farm, in the vicinity of Farmer Drive today. The 4th Michigan cavalry was detached and sent past the Fosterville road, until they reached the Griffin Road, (Highway 3), which followed the railroad tracks, where they continued to move in a south eastward direction toward Liberty Church, (Near Highway 81), without incident and began to dismantle the line. Meanwhile, the remainder of the division continued toward Lovejoy's Station, with Minty's First Brigade leading the way.(Evans 1996:438).
Soon the 7th Pennsylvania, leading the First Brigade, met a line of Confederate skirmishers. They were easily pushed back, encouraging the Union cavalry as they quickened their pace toward the railroad. When they had gotten to within a quarter mile of the depot, the Confederates took cover in a thicket of brush and increased their resistance. Minty ordered the 7th Pennsylvania to dismount and fight on foot, and deployed the Forth Regulars to the right to extent the line. Just as the Forth Regulars were dismounting, however, Reynold's Arkansas brigade and Armstrong's Mississippi brigade burst out of their hiding place in the railroad cut and emptied a devastating volley at the approaching Yankee force. They then rushed the startled cavalry, easily running over them and killing, wounding, or capturing 5 officers and over 60 men. When Corporal Dornblaster of the 7th Pennsylvania, shot in the foot and on the run, reached where the horses were being held, Captain Israel Schaeffer asked, where the rest of the men were. "They are killed or captured," replied Dornblaster (Evans 1996:440-441).
Less than a mile to the north, the 4th Michigan was busy tearing up the tracks when they heard the commotion near the depot, and some of the men from the 7th Pennsylvania came up on their Skirmishers with word that they been ambushed and taken a bad beating by a superior force, Major Frank Mix, in command of the 4th Michigan, organized his men for battle and awaited orders.
The Chicago Board of Trade Battery, marching in rear of the first brigade, saw the remnants of the lead brigade emerging from the woods at a run. Lieutenant George Robinson of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery set up his guns in the middle of a cornfield on the south side of the Fayetteville-McDonough Road and trained them on the edge of the woods were Minty's advance guard was emerging helter-skelter to escape the Confederate infantry. Robinson hoped that when they realized they had some artillery support, the panicked troops would rally and prevent a total route. He did just that, showering the Confederates with shells and sending a cheer through the ranks of the hard-pressed Union skirmishers (Evans 1996:441-443).
By this time, the head of Colonel Eli Long's Second Division had reached the action and were sent up to reinforce Minty. The 4th Ohio established a line to the right of Robinson's battery and Minty's men began falling into the line to hold off the Confederate advance. When the Confederates hesitated under the artillery fire and renewed attack of the Union cavalry forces, the U.S. forces were encouraged to charge. However, the Confederate forces were too strong, firing into the exposed Union line and dropping a number of officers and enlisted men. The Union forces regrouped behind and to the side of Robinson's battery and were soon being assaulted from all sides. Robinson's four guns were swung from side to side, sweeping the woods around the field in which the Union cavalry found itself nearly surrounded. The artillery was effective, but the battery was running low on ammunition and in the heat of battle, one of the guns had broken its trail, causing the barrel of the gun to swing free and rendering it useless. With Reynold's and Armstrong's men closing in, the line could not hold, and Minty and Robinson retreated, leaving the disabled gun in the cornfield (Evans 1996:443).
At the east end of the cornfield, Minty's men found refuge behind some barricades constructed by the 1st Ohio cavalry that had come up behind the 4th Ohio. Minty has recalled the 4th Michigan from the railroad, and they arrived on the right flank and began extending the line with barricades. The Confederate infantry then came across the cornfield, absorbing rounds of fire from the Union's Spencer carbine rifles until they were finally halted. The remainder of Kilpatrick's was now arriving on the scene and was deployed in a second line behind Minty and Long. Reynold's was now the one who was outnumbered, and not wanting to reveal that his force consisted of less than a thousand men, he called off the advance and retreated to the opposite end of the field and the protection of the tree cover. This lull allowed a group of volunteers to carefully work their way onto the field and retrieve the damaged gun (Figure 13) (Evans 1996:444).
Although Reynolds and Armstrong had been checked, Kilpatrick knew that William "Red" Jackson's cavalry was likely on the way, and reports also had come in that Cleburne was coming south on the railroad with more enforcements. In fact, as the Confederates withdrew, the sound of Ross's Texas cavalry approaching on the Lee's Mill-Lovejoy Road could be heard. Lieutenant Fielder Jones' Second Brigade of Kilpatrick's division set about barricading the road behind them, and hurried to secure a position on high ground to the rear, (high ridge west of Nash Farm). Supported by Captain Yates V. Beebe's 10th Wisconsin Battery with his four 3-inch ordnance rifles. They began to tear down slave cabins, perhaps those o Stephen Dorsey's slaves, to build barricades for the artillery. Ross' Texas brigade reached the split in the Lee's Mill and McDonough Roads near Nash Farm and established a line there. A single howitzer manned by the Columbus, Georgia Battery was deployed on the right of the road in a walnut grove on a small knoll that sits almost directly opposite the existing Nash house in the northwest corner of the Nash property. Ross' cavalry formed a line primarily to the south and east of this battery, extending across the McDonough Road and along the high ground occupied by the Nash Farm outbuildings on the north side of Walnut Creek (Evans 1996:444-445).
When the Confederate skirmishers were within range, Jones' men opened fire and Ross' men returned the favor. The Dorsey house was now being hit from every side and the house was riddled with bullets, and a Union officer yelled at Lucinda Dorsey, who was inside, to lie down on the floor. With Confederate forces attacking from nearly every angle, Kilpatrick's men struggled to figure out which way to fire. Wrote William Webb of the 3rd Battalion of 4th Regulars, who arrived on the scene from the east where they had picketing the roads; "A fierce battle seemed now to be going on in every direction, but which was the front or main point of attack I could not for the life of me tell. Artillery and musketry were pouring their deadly missiles into our front, rear and both flanks. I could find for the moment no one to report to, and was uncertain and somewhat bewildered as to what I should do with my handful of men." When an aide from Kilpatrick arrived with the order to construct a barrier, Webb asked, "Which way shall I face it?" The messenger replied, "Suit yourself." (Evans 1996:445-446).
Meanwhile, Kilpatrick conferred with Minty and Eli Murray, commanding Kilpatrick's Third Brigade, near the Dorsey house, pointing out what was no doubt obvious to all parties at that point. They were surrounded, Kilpatrick suggested that their only hope was to cut their way out and make a break for it, as McCook had done at Brown's Mill, and he wanted Minty to lead the charge. The charge was to be made down the McDonough Road through a "deserted plantation creased in every direction by rain gullies, and there were two rail fences between us and the enemy" (Minty 1903). Forbes (1993:211), drawing from an account in the Columbus (Ga.) Times reported that the Yankees were about four miles from Lovejoy's and near the Nash place when they "got surrounded." This account also mentions the Thompson Plantation, where Kilpatrick turned to the east, toward McDonough. This may have been a reference to Thompson Nash, who owned most of the land in the area. Although some reports state that the charge was to the north, several others confirm that the Union cavalry was driven back a distance north before turning to the east to make the charge.
According to Kilpatrick's report, he directed Minty to form his command in three columns by regiment, with the regiments in groups of four. Minty, in his article in the National Tribune some 40 years later, recalled that Kilpatrick had originally ordered the cavalry to form a line for the charge, but Minty had expressed his opinion that such a charge over that rough ground would hit the Confederate line weakly and would not accomplish the task of breaking the line. He suggested that the units be formed in columns, stirrup-to-stirrup, and to charge the line in the manner of a locomotive, with all to follow through the gap formed in the line. According to Minty, after some consideration, Kilpatrick's reply was, "Form in any way you please." The 4th Michigan's Record of Events notes that originally they formed in a line, but were soon after organized in columns for the charge. This may have been because the cavalry was used to forming in this manner, but was redirected by Minty; or it may have been that Kilpatrick began forming a line, then recognized the virtues of Minty's plan (Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies [OR] 1997: Series 1: Volume 38: Part 2: 859 [all subsequent references are cited as OR 1997:1:38:2:859]; Minty 1903; OR 1997: Supplement 29:825).
In any case, the configuration proved a success. Minty "moved into the field south of the McDonough Road, facing east." and placed his 4th Michigan brigade at the end of the column, with the 7th Pennsylvania on his right, on the McDonough Road, and the 4th U.S. Cavalry Regulars on the left. Eli Long's three Ohio regiments lined up behind Minty's, and Eli Murray's three regiments were in the rear, with one ordered to watch Reynolds, whose men had taken refuge in the railroad cut, but were keeping up a continuous fire. Minty advised Long to keep close to the units in their front and to maintain their columns as tightly as possible. The ranks formed behind the ridge, (just west of Nash Farm) on which Jones's men had established their line facing Ross's Texas Brigade (Figure 14). At about 2 p.m. Kilpatrick rode up and approved the formation. As all was made ready, many of the men discarded any excess baggage, including "horseshoes, blankets, haversacks, ammunition, carbines, camp utensils, and clothing" (quoted in Evans 1996:448). The cavalrymen were going to rely on their little used sabers to make the charge work. The force would need to hit the enemy hard and fast, hoping to strike fear in their hearts with the speed and power of man, horse, and steel. (Map)
After some delay in getting all in order, the column started at a trot toward Ross' cavalry posted across the McDonough Road at Nash Farm and blocking their escape. When they were within range for a charge, the order was given and the whole expedition, comprising some 4,000 men, broke into a full run. A detachment of men on foot from each regiment went ahead of the charge to take down rail fences and the horses raced through the gaps. The charge was across a cornfield, the stalks of which, grown high by late August, pounding the legs of the men and their horses. The Confederate howitzer fired away at the approaching column, but the dismounted cavalry could only watch until the juggernaut was in range. By most accounts, Ross's men held their line and fired a volley into the charge, causing "a momentary flutter," but there was little time for a second shot before the Union charge hit their line. The rifles nearly worthless at such range, many of Ross's men scattered to escape the crush of the sabers (Evans 1996:448-451).
The scene was a bloody horror, as Union cavalrymen hacked away at the enemy, slashing off limbs and crushing skulls. Ross' men could do little once the Union mass was among them except to fight for their lives or surrender. "Our men were mounted on the gallop and…cut them down right and left," recalled Captain Robert Burns. "I was just about to strike two, when they threw up their hands and surrendered. I passed them by, leaving someone in the rear to take care of them. A third who did not surrender fast enough, I struck him full on top of the head, felt my saber sink in, saw him fall, and dashed on. This type of hand to hand combat was rare during the Civil War and was described by many of the combatants as one of the most difficult and dramatic moments of their war experience. Not all of the Union horsemen were so eager with the sword. Albert Potter of the 4th Michigan wrote, "They surrendered by the dozens, but many were cut down without mercy, for my part I could not strike them down after they had given up and but very few did hit them in our regiment, but the Regulars - slashed left and right, and left many a poor devil's brains lay scattered on the ground - from there it was nothing but a Panic, they just ran like dogs." (quoted in Evans 1996:451).
As the second line regiments poured into the gap created by Minty's men, George Young kept up the fire from his lone artillery piece on high ground north of the road. The 4th Regulars had run past him without taking out the gun, and he had turned it 180 degrees to fire on their backs as they ran past. Once turned back to the front, the howitzer was causing considerable damage. Frank Mix of the 4th Michigan called for help in taking the gun out, and a contingent of men made their way through the woods on the south side of the road. Emerging on the road, they connected with Eli Long's Second Brigade, which had broken into smaller units after coming through the center of the line behind Minty's Brigade. General Ross could see that the gun was in danger and sent orders to Young to withdraw, but Young refused to move until he had no more shots. Ross sent 30 men to help young and his small contingent of gunners to hold the position, and round after round was fired into the oncoming wave of blue. By this time, the Third Division had withdrawn from their position guarding the rear and had rapidly formed to make their run. As they came under the still booming rebel gun, Kilpatrick and his men led a renewed charge on the battery. Young's men fired off their final shell and abandoned the gun, just as the Yankees were pulling down the fence protecting the position and were scrambling up the slope to the gun. They procured a spare limber from the Board of Trade Battery and loaded up the captured piece (Evans 1996:452-454).
Kilpatrick's men were well into the line by this time and had scattered Ross' command. The crowd of wagons and ambulances in the McDonough Road behind Ross' line slowed the progress of the charge through the line, and men and horses were thrown into confusion. The Confederates had taken refuge in the woods and continued to fire on the Union troops, who were still in considerable disarray. Major Albert Woodcock's 92nd Illinois regiment were bring up the rear and were marching down the McDonough Road when a group of Confederates fired into their ranks from the trees to the left of the road. The regiment turned and fired their Spencer carbine rifles into the woods and were hit with another round from the Confederates before they ran off (Evans 1996:454-455).
Kilpatrick began to pull the units together, directing them to march toward McDonough. It was some time before order was restored, as many of the men were chasing down horses or mules to replace their lost mounts, or had become separated from their regiments. As many as could be safely retrieved were loaded onto the ambulances at the rear, but many wounded and most of the dead had to be left behind, because the Confederate forces were beginning to reform behind them. Eli Long's 2nd Brigade of Ohioans took cover behind "a couple of log cabins and some apple trees" (Evans 1996:455) about a mile east of the Nash Farm. Armstrong's Mississippi cavalry brigade was soon on them. The Mississippians had been in transit toward Jonesboro when word of the fight at Lovejoy's reached them, and they arrived at the scene just as the charge was ending. According to Sydney Champion of the 28th Mississippi Cavalry, the battlefield was littered with wounded and dying men and horses, along with all manner of weapons, ammunition, cartridge boxes, saddlebags, food, and camp equipment (Evans 1996:456).
Armstrong's Brigade charged on after the retreating Union Cavalry, catching up to them where Walnut Creek crosses the McDonough Road. Eli Long held off the hard charging Confederates long enough for the Union column to reach safety early in the morning of the 21st. They bivouacked south of the Cotton River (Big Cotton Indian Creek) near McDonough, then beat a hasty retreat back to Decatur through Lithonia, sinking the captured Confederate howitzer at Big Cotton River when it became unwieldy (Scaife 1993:121).
Kilpatrick reported the raid as a success, noting, "We effectively destroyed four miles of the Macon road, from Jonesborough to Bear Creek Station, a distance of ten miles. One train of cars was fully, and a second partially, destroyed. We brought into camp 1 gun, 3 battle-flags, and a large number of fresh horses and mules and about 50 prisoners. My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing will not exceed 300 men." He protested to reports that the damage to the railroad was not significant, saying on the 23rd that it would be four or five days before it could be repaired (he initially said 10 days). In fact, trains were already coming into Atlanta on the same day that he wrote this (OR 1997:1:38:2:855,859; Scaife 1993:122).
The battle flag of the 10th Georgia Infantry Regiment, "Benjamin Infantry" was taken from the bureau drawers of the Johnson house that was located across the road from Noah's Ark Church. The battle flag of the 3rd Texas cavalry was accidentally captured when an ambulance taken during the cavalry charge was discovered in the contents of the ambulance some days latter. The battle flag of the 27th Georgia Infantry which was also reportedly captured by Kilpatrick's Raiders was also stolen from the bureau drawers of the Colonel Charles T. Zachry home that was located at that time on Georgia Highway 20 near Big Cotton Indian Creek (Evans 1996:436).
For further reading of the Cavalry Battle you can check out: Croft's Flying Artillery, Forbes book; (Hauling Brass) describes the action which took place on August 20, 1864
Kilpatrick's August 20, 1864 Breakthrough - Page 211
Nash Place - Page 211
Position of Ross and his artillery - Page 211
Pvt. George W. Bedell, gallantry in action near Jonesboro, GA 8/20/1864 (p.273)
Pvt. A. J. Baxley - detached as brigade ambulance driver (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.272)
Pvt. W. T. Ferrell - gallantry in action near Jonesboro, GA 8/20/1864 (p.278)
Pvt. H.P. Fisher - captured near Jonesboro, GA 8/20/1864, POW Camp Chase, Ohio, Sept. 1-5, 1864 (p.278)
August 20, 1864 - Sgt. Maj. George B. Forbes - gallantry . . . (p.279)
August 20, 1864 - Sgt. Mark A. Golden - gallantry . . . (p.280)
August 20, 1864 - Cpl. E.C. Horsby - gallantry . . . (p.282)
Cpl. A.F. Knight - killed in action near Jonesboro 8/19/1864 (p.284)
(2 of 3 brothers in Croft's Flying Artillery)
Pvt. Allen P. McDaniel - wounded near Jonesboro 8/19/1864 (p.286)
Pvt. Christopher Columbus McDaniel - gallantry . . ., captured near Jonesboro 8/20/1864, POW Camp Chase, Ohio, Sept. 1, 1864 - paroled for exchange at Camp Chase 2/25/1865 (p.286)
Pvt. Nathan W. McLane - gallantry . . . 8/20/1864, U.S. record cites Lovejoy Station POW Camp Chase, Ohio Sept. 1, 1864. Applied for oak of allegiance to U.S. Jan. 1865. Enlisted in U.S. Army and transferred to Chicago, Illinois 3/20/1865, deserted U.S. service 8/16/1865 (p.287)
Pvt. George Washington Padget - gallantry . . . POW Camp Chase, Ohio, Sept. 1-5, 1864 (p.290)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. Robert D. Sims - gallantry . . . (p.294)
Pvt. John Skinner - detailed ambulance driver (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.294)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. S. Skurlock - gallantry . . . (p.294)
Pvt. John H. Smith - on Ross' brigade blacksmith detail (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.294)
Pvt. Joseph Storey - sent to Eufaula, AL with wounded horses (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.295)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. Wm. J. Tidwell - gallantry . . . (p.297)
Pvt. W. H. Trussell - sent to Carrollton, GA with wounded horses (Jul-Aug. 1864) (p.297)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. J.A. Wallace - gallantry . . . (p.297)
Pvt. William Wallace - wounded near Jonesboro, GA 8/19/1864 (p.298)
Pvt. R.F. Williams - sent to Carrollton with wounded horses (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.299)
Pvt. Thomas E. Williams - sent to Carrollton with wounded horses (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.299)
Pvt. W.B. Yarbrough - detailed as hospital nurse (Jul-Aug 1864)
August 20, 1864 - 1st Lt. George B. Young - gallantry . . . (p.301)
Garrard's First and Second Brigades, under Colonel Robert Minty and Colonel Eli Long and supported by the Chicago Board of Trade Battery, were leading the way toward the railroad at Lovejoy's. When the cavalry had gotten just past Nash Farm, they came to the intersection of the current McDonough Road, with the old Fosterville Road, where the Stephen G. Dorsey house stood. The Fosterville Road ran east-west. To the west, the road crossed the Macon and Western Railroad about a mile north of the station at Lovejoy's; to the east, the road followed the south side of Walnut Creek, before rejoining the McDonough Road to the east of Nash Farm, in the vicinity of Farmer Drive today. The 4th Michigan cavalry was detached and sent past the Fosterville road, until they reached the Griffin Road, (Highway 3), which followed the railroad tracks, where they continued to move in a south eastward direction toward Liberty Church, (Near Highway 81), without incident and began to dismantle the line. Meanwhile, the remainder of the division continued toward Lovejoy's Station, with Minty's First Brigade leading the way.(Evans 1996:438).
Soon the 7th Pennsylvania, leading the First Brigade, met a line of Confederate skirmishers. They were easily pushed back, encouraging the Union cavalry as they quickened their pace toward the railroad. When they had gotten to within a quarter mile of the depot, the Confederates took cover in a thicket of brush and increased their resistance. Minty ordered the 7th Pennsylvania to dismount and fight on foot, and deployed the Forth Regulars to the right to extent the line. Just as the Forth Regulars were dismounting, however, Reynold's Arkansas brigade and Armstrong's Mississippi brigade burst out of their hiding place in the railroad cut and emptied a devastating volley at the approaching Yankee force. They then rushed the startled cavalry, easily running over them and killing, wounding, or capturing 5 officers and over 60 men. When Corporal Dornblaster of the 7th Pennsylvania, shot in the foot and on the run, reached where the horses were being held, Captain Israel Schaeffer asked, where the rest of the men were. "They are killed or captured," replied Dornblaster (Evans 1996:440-441).
Less than a mile to the north, the 4th Michigan was busy tearing up the tracks when they heard the commotion near the depot, and some of the men from the 7th Pennsylvania came up on their Skirmishers with word that they been ambushed and taken a bad beating by a superior force, Major Frank Mix, in command of the 4th Michigan, organized his men for battle and awaited orders.
The Chicago Board of Trade Battery, marching in rear of the first brigade, saw the remnants of the lead brigade emerging from the woods at a run. Lieutenant George Robinson of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery set up his guns in the middle of a cornfield on the south side of the Fayetteville-McDonough Road and trained them on the edge of the woods were Minty's advance guard was emerging helter-skelter to escape the Confederate infantry. Robinson hoped that when they realized they had some artillery support, the panicked troops would rally and prevent a total route. He did just that, showering the Confederates with shells and sending a cheer through the ranks of the hard-pressed Union skirmishers (Evans 1996:441-443).
By this time, the head of Colonel Eli Long's Second Division had reached the action and were sent up to reinforce Minty. The 4th Ohio established a line to the right of Robinson's battery and Minty's men began falling into the line to hold off the Confederate advance. When the Confederates hesitated under the artillery fire and renewed attack of the Union cavalry forces, the U.S. forces were encouraged to charge. However, the Confederate forces were too strong, firing into the exposed Union line and dropping a number of officers and enlisted men. The Union forces regrouped behind and to the side of Robinson's battery and were soon being assaulted from all sides. Robinson's four guns were swung from side to side, sweeping the woods around the field in which the Union cavalry found itself nearly surrounded. The artillery was effective, but the battery was running low on ammunition and in the heat of battle, one of the guns had broken its trail, causing the barrel of the gun to swing free and rendering it useless. With Reynold's and Armstrong's men closing in, the line could not hold, and Minty and Robinson retreated, leaving the disabled gun in the cornfield (Evans 1996:443).
At the east end of the cornfield, Minty's men found refuge behind some barricades constructed by the 1st Ohio cavalry that had come up behind the 4th Ohio. Minty has recalled the 4th Michigan from the railroad, and they arrived on the right flank and began extending the line with barricades. The Confederate infantry then came across the cornfield, absorbing rounds of fire from the Union's Spencer carbine rifles until they were finally halted. The remainder of Kilpatrick's was now arriving on the scene and was deployed in a second line behind Minty and Long. Reynold's was now the one who was outnumbered, and not wanting to reveal that his force consisted of less than a thousand men, he called off the advance and retreated to the opposite end of the field and the protection of the tree cover. This lull allowed a group of volunteers to carefully work their way onto the field and retrieve the damaged gun (Figure 13) (Evans 1996:444).
Although Reynolds and Armstrong had been checked, Kilpatrick knew that William "Red" Jackson's cavalry was likely on the way, and reports also had come in that Cleburne was coming south on the railroad with more enforcements. In fact, as the Confederates withdrew, the sound of Ross's Texas cavalry approaching on the Lee's Mill-Lovejoy Road could be heard. Lieutenant Fielder Jones' Second Brigade of Kilpatrick's division set about barricading the road behind them, and hurried to secure a position on high ground to the rear, (high ridge west of Nash Farm). Supported by Captain Yates V. Beebe's 10th Wisconsin Battery with his four 3-inch ordnance rifles. They began to tear down slave cabins, perhaps those o Stephen Dorsey's slaves, to build barricades for the artillery. Ross' Texas brigade reached the split in the Lee's Mill and McDonough Roads near Nash Farm and established a line there. A single howitzer manned by the Columbus, Georgia Battery was deployed on the right of the road in a walnut grove on a small knoll that sits almost directly opposite the existing Nash house in the northwest corner of the Nash property. Ross' cavalry formed a line primarily to the south and east of this battery, extending across the McDonough Road and along the high ground occupied by the Nash Farm outbuildings on the north side of Walnut Creek (Evans 1996:444-445).
When the Confederate skirmishers were within range, Jones' men opened fire and Ross' men returned the favor. The Dorsey house was now being hit from every side and the house was riddled with bullets, and a Union officer yelled at Lucinda Dorsey, who was inside, to lie down on the floor. With Confederate forces attacking from nearly every angle, Kilpatrick's men struggled to figure out which way to fire. Wrote William Webb of the 3rd Battalion of 4th Regulars, who arrived on the scene from the east where they had picketing the roads; "A fierce battle seemed now to be going on in every direction, but which was the front or main point of attack I could not for the life of me tell. Artillery and musketry were pouring their deadly missiles into our front, rear and both flanks. I could find for the moment no one to report to, and was uncertain and somewhat bewildered as to what I should do with my handful of men." When an aide from Kilpatrick arrived with the order to construct a barrier, Webb asked, "Which way shall I face it?" The messenger replied, "Suit yourself." (Evans 1996:445-446).
Meanwhile, Kilpatrick conferred with Minty and Eli Murray, commanding Kilpatrick's Third Brigade, near the Dorsey house, pointing out what was no doubt obvious to all parties at that point. They were surrounded, Kilpatrick suggested that their only hope was to cut their way out and make a break for it, as McCook had done at Brown's Mill, and he wanted Minty to lead the charge. The charge was to be made down the McDonough Road through a "deserted plantation creased in every direction by rain gullies, and there were two rail fences between us and the enemy" (Minty 1903). Forbes (1993:211), drawing from an account in the Columbus (Ga.) Times reported that the Yankees were about four miles from Lovejoy's and near the Nash place when they "got surrounded." This account also mentions the Thompson Plantation, where Kilpatrick turned to the east, toward McDonough. This may have been a reference to Thompson Nash, who owned most of the land in the area. Although some reports state that the charge was to the north, several others confirm that the Union cavalry was driven back a distance north before turning to the east to make the charge.
According to Kilpatrick's report, he directed Minty to form his command in three columns by regiment, with the regiments in groups of four. Minty, in his article in the National Tribune some 40 years later, recalled that Kilpatrick had originally ordered the cavalry to form a line for the charge, but Minty had expressed his opinion that such a charge over that rough ground would hit the Confederate line weakly and would not accomplish the task of breaking the line. He suggested that the units be formed in columns, stirrup-to-stirrup, and to charge the line in the manner of a locomotive, with all to follow through the gap formed in the line. According to Minty, after some consideration, Kilpatrick's reply was, "Form in any way you please." The 4th Michigan's Record of Events notes that originally they formed in a line, but were soon after organized in columns for the charge. This may have been because the cavalry was used to forming in this manner, but was redirected by Minty; or it may have been that Kilpatrick began forming a line, then recognized the virtues of Minty's plan (Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies [OR] 1997: Series 1: Volume 38: Part 2: 859 [all subsequent references are cited as OR 1997:1:38:2:859]; Minty 1903; OR 1997: Supplement 29:825).
In any case, the configuration proved a success. Minty "moved into the field south of the McDonough Road, facing east." and placed his 4th Michigan brigade at the end of the column, with the 7th Pennsylvania on his right, on the McDonough Road, and the 4th U.S. Cavalry Regulars on the left. Eli Long's three Ohio regiments lined up behind Minty's, and Eli Murray's three regiments were in the rear, with one ordered to watch Reynolds, whose men had taken refuge in the railroad cut, but were keeping up a continuous fire. Minty advised Long to keep close to the units in their front and to maintain their columns as tightly as possible. The ranks formed behind the ridge, (just west of Nash Farm) on which Jones's men had established their line facing Ross's Texas Brigade (Figure 14). At about 2 p.m. Kilpatrick rode up and approved the formation. As all was made ready, many of the men discarded any excess baggage, including "horseshoes, blankets, haversacks, ammunition, carbines, camp utensils, and clothing" (quoted in Evans 1996:448). The cavalrymen were going to rely on their little used sabers to make the charge work. The force would need to hit the enemy hard and fast, hoping to strike fear in their hearts with the speed and power of man, horse, and steel. (Map)
After some delay in getting all in order, the column started at a trot toward Ross' cavalry posted across the McDonough Road at Nash Farm and blocking their escape. When they were within range for a charge, the order was given and the whole expedition, comprising some 4,000 men, broke into a full run. A detachment of men on foot from each regiment went ahead of the charge to take down rail fences and the horses raced through the gaps. The charge was across a cornfield, the stalks of which, grown high by late August, pounding the legs of the men and their horses. The Confederate howitzer fired away at the approaching column, but the dismounted cavalry could only watch until the juggernaut was in range. By most accounts, Ross's men held their line and fired a volley into the charge, causing "a momentary flutter," but there was little time for a second shot before the Union charge hit their line. The rifles nearly worthless at such range, many of Ross's men scattered to escape the crush of the sabers (Evans 1996:448-451).
The scene was a bloody horror, as Union cavalrymen hacked away at the enemy, slashing off limbs and crushing skulls. Ross' men could do little once the Union mass was among them except to fight for their lives or surrender. "Our men were mounted on the gallop and…cut them down right and left," recalled Captain Robert Burns. "I was just about to strike two, when they threw up their hands and surrendered. I passed them by, leaving someone in the rear to take care of them. A third who did not surrender fast enough, I struck him full on top of the head, felt my saber sink in, saw him fall, and dashed on. This type of hand to hand combat was rare during the Civil War and was described by many of the combatants as one of the most difficult and dramatic moments of their war experience. Not all of the Union horsemen were so eager with the sword. Albert Potter of the 4th Michigan wrote, "They surrendered by the dozens, but many were cut down without mercy, for my part I could not strike them down after they had given up and but very few did hit them in our regiment, but the Regulars - slashed left and right, and left many a poor devil's brains lay scattered on the ground - from there it was nothing but a Panic, they just ran like dogs." (quoted in Evans 1996:451).
As the second line regiments poured into the gap created by Minty's men, George Young kept up the fire from his lone artillery piece on high ground north of the road. The 4th Regulars had run past him without taking out the gun, and he had turned it 180 degrees to fire on their backs as they ran past. Once turned back to the front, the howitzer was causing considerable damage. Frank Mix of the 4th Michigan called for help in taking the gun out, and a contingent of men made their way through the woods on the south side of the road. Emerging on the road, they connected with Eli Long's Second Brigade, which had broken into smaller units after coming through the center of the line behind Minty's Brigade. General Ross could see that the gun was in danger and sent orders to Young to withdraw, but Young refused to move until he had no more shots. Ross sent 30 men to help young and his small contingent of gunners to hold the position, and round after round was fired into the oncoming wave of blue. By this time, the Third Division had withdrawn from their position guarding the rear and had rapidly formed to make their run. As they came under the still booming rebel gun, Kilpatrick and his men led a renewed charge on the battery. Young's men fired off their final shell and abandoned the gun, just as the Yankees were pulling down the fence protecting the position and were scrambling up the slope to the gun. They procured a spare limber from the Board of Trade Battery and loaded up the captured piece (Evans 1996:452-454).
Kilpatrick's men were well into the line by this time and had scattered Ross' command. The crowd of wagons and ambulances in the McDonough Road behind Ross' line slowed the progress of the charge through the line, and men and horses were thrown into confusion. The Confederates had taken refuge in the woods and continued to fire on the Union troops, who were still in considerable disarray. Major Albert Woodcock's 92nd Illinois regiment were bring up the rear and were marching down the McDonough Road when a group of Confederates fired into their ranks from the trees to the left of the road. The regiment turned and fired their Spencer carbine rifles into the woods and were hit with another round from the Confederates before they ran off (Evans 1996:454-455).
Kilpatrick began to pull the units together, directing them to march toward McDonough. It was some time before order was restored, as many of the men were chasing down horses or mules to replace their lost mounts, or had become separated from their regiments. As many as could be safely retrieved were loaded onto the ambulances at the rear, but many wounded and most of the dead had to be left behind, because the Confederate forces were beginning to reform behind them. Eli Long's 2nd Brigade of Ohioans took cover behind "a couple of log cabins and some apple trees" (Evans 1996:455) about a mile east of the Nash Farm. Armstrong's Mississippi cavalry brigade was soon on them. The Mississippians had been in transit toward Jonesboro when word of the fight at Lovejoy's reached them, and they arrived at the scene just as the charge was ending. According to Sydney Champion of the 28th Mississippi Cavalry, the battlefield was littered with wounded and dying men and horses, along with all manner of weapons, ammunition, cartridge boxes, saddlebags, food, and camp equipment (Evans 1996:456).
Armstrong's Brigade charged on after the retreating Union Cavalry, catching up to them where Walnut Creek crosses the McDonough Road. Eli Long held off the hard charging Confederates long enough for the Union column to reach safety early in the morning of the 21st. They bivouacked south of the Cotton River (Big Cotton Indian Creek) near McDonough, then beat a hasty retreat back to Decatur through Lithonia, sinking the captured Confederate howitzer at Big Cotton River when it became unwieldy (Scaife 1993:121).
Kilpatrick reported the raid as a success, noting, "We effectively destroyed four miles of the Macon road, from Jonesborough to Bear Creek Station, a distance of ten miles. One train of cars was fully, and a second partially, destroyed. We brought into camp 1 gun, 3 battle-flags, and a large number of fresh horses and mules and about 50 prisoners. My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing will not exceed 300 men." He protested to reports that the damage to the railroad was not significant, saying on the 23rd that it would be four or five days before it could be repaired (he initially said 10 days). In fact, trains were already coming into Atlanta on the same day that he wrote this (OR 1997:1:38:2:855,859; Scaife 1993:122).
The battle flag of the 10th Georgia Infantry Regiment, "Benjamin Infantry" was taken from the bureau drawers of the Johnson house that was located across the road from Noah's Ark Church. The battle flag of the 3rd Texas cavalry was accidentally captured when an ambulance taken during the cavalry charge was discovered in the contents of the ambulance some days latter. The battle flag of the 27th Georgia Infantry which was also reportedly captured by Kilpatrick's Raiders was also stolen from the bureau drawers of the Colonel Charles T. Zachry home that was located at that time on Georgia Highway 20 near Big Cotton Indian Creek (Evans 1996:436).
For further reading of the Cavalry Battle you can check out: Croft's Flying Artillery, Forbes book; (Hauling Brass) describes the action which took place on August 20, 1864
Kilpatrick's August 20, 1864 Breakthrough - Page 211
Nash Place - Page 211
Position of Ross and his artillery - Page 211
Pvt. George W. Bedell, gallantry in action near Jonesboro, GA 8/20/1864 (p.273)
Pvt. A. J. Baxley - detached as brigade ambulance driver (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.272)
Pvt. W. T. Ferrell - gallantry in action near Jonesboro, GA 8/20/1864 (p.278)
Pvt. H.P. Fisher - captured near Jonesboro, GA 8/20/1864, POW Camp Chase, Ohio, Sept. 1-5, 1864 (p.278)
August 20, 1864 - Sgt. Maj. George B. Forbes - gallantry . . . (p.279)
August 20, 1864 - Sgt. Mark A. Golden - gallantry . . . (p.280)
August 20, 1864 - Cpl. E.C. Horsby - gallantry . . . (p.282)
Cpl. A.F. Knight - killed in action near Jonesboro 8/19/1864 (p.284)
(2 of 3 brothers in Croft's Flying Artillery)
Pvt. Allen P. McDaniel - wounded near Jonesboro 8/19/1864 (p.286)
Pvt. Christopher Columbus McDaniel - gallantry . . ., captured near Jonesboro 8/20/1864, POW Camp Chase, Ohio, Sept. 1, 1864 - paroled for exchange at Camp Chase 2/25/1865 (p.286)
Pvt. Nathan W. McLane - gallantry . . . 8/20/1864, U.S. record cites Lovejoy Station POW Camp Chase, Ohio Sept. 1, 1864. Applied for oak of allegiance to U.S. Jan. 1865. Enlisted in U.S. Army and transferred to Chicago, Illinois 3/20/1865, deserted U.S. service 8/16/1865 (p.287)
Pvt. George Washington Padget - gallantry . . . POW Camp Chase, Ohio, Sept. 1-5, 1864 (p.290)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. Robert D. Sims - gallantry . . . (p.294)
Pvt. John Skinner - detailed ambulance driver (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.294)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. S. Skurlock - gallantry . . . (p.294)
Pvt. John H. Smith - on Ross' brigade blacksmith detail (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.294)
Pvt. Joseph Storey - sent to Eufaula, AL with wounded horses (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.295)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. Wm. J. Tidwell - gallantry . . . (p.297)
Pvt. W. H. Trussell - sent to Carrollton, GA with wounded horses (Jul-Aug. 1864) (p.297)
August 20, 1864 - Pvt. J.A. Wallace - gallantry . . . (p.297)
Pvt. William Wallace - wounded near Jonesboro, GA 8/19/1864 (p.298)
Pvt. R.F. Williams - sent to Carrollton with wounded horses (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.299)
Pvt. Thomas E. Williams - sent to Carrollton with wounded horses (Jul-Aug 1864) (p.299)
Pvt. W.B. Yarbrough - detailed as hospital nurse (Jul-Aug 1864)
August 20, 1864 - 1st Lt. George B. Young - gallantry . . . (p.301)
Kilpatrick's Raid Menu of Links
- Order of Battle
- Kilpatrick's Raid & Minty's Charge
- Robert W.Wilson's 4th US Cavalry
- Frank Mix - 4th Mich.Cavalry
- Charles O. Brown - 3rd Ohio Cavalry
- Sherman's Report on Kilpatrick's Raid
- Summary of Battle Aug.20th, 1864
- Kilpatrick's Raid Estimates of Killed, Wounded, and Missing
- Significance of Raid
- Statement from Archaeologist Dan Elliot