Kilpatrick's Raid had demonstrated that even a large cavalry action could not, or as Sherman groused, "would not," inflict enough damage on the Confederate supply lines around the city to force General Hood from behind his defenses there. Subsequently, Sherman decided that a more definitive move was necessary and ordered nearly his whole army from its base on the Chattahoochee River around to the west and south to cut the railroad lines and accomplish his objective (
Scaife 1993:122, 131).
On August 25, he left Slocum's 20th Army Corps (A.C.) at the Chattahoochee to protect their supply line, while the reminder of his force set out around to the southwest, crossing Camp Creek and screening his movements with a southward line from East Point. They made quick progress toward the West Point Railroad, as Hood did not send a sufficient force in time to block the movement, thinking that it was only a bluff. He sent General William J. Hardee's and General Stephen D. Lee's corps to Jonesboro, instructing them to drive whatever forces they encountered back across the Flint River should they cross it. Instead, Sherman's left flank was able to reach the railroad at Rough and Ready north of Jonesboro on September1, cutting Hardee off from Atlanta and facing the entire Army of the Tennessee from his defenses at Jonesboro. After two days of battle, Hardee finally was forced to abandon the town during the night, retreating six miles south to Lovejoy's Station where he again entrenched (
Scaife 1993:131-134).
Meanwhile, Hood left Atlanta in the early morning hours of September 2 after blowing up a large supply of ammunition stored at the rail yards to prevent it from falling into Union hands. On the morning of September 2, Slocum's men found the city empty, and the mayor riding out under a white flag. Word of this did not reach Sherman until the 3rd, however, and though he had heard the noise of the ammunition explosion from his position at Jonesboro, he was not certain of its meaning and so pressed on against Hardee until he got confirmation from a reliable source that Atlanta was occupied by Union forces (
Castel 1992:524-527, 530).
Sherman pursued Hardee to Lovejoy's Station, and found the Confederates in a strong position, being made stronger by the on-going construction of earthworks and abates. The line ran east-west along a ridge known as Cedar Bluffs, with the right and left anchored on streams and the front protected by a series of swamps and tangled brush. Major General Stanley of the 4th A.C., who occupied the left of the Union line, wrote to Sherman that the Confederate line was about a half-mile north of Lovejoy's Station in front of the McDonough-Fayetteville Road. "I think, he observed, "their object is to hold this road to make a junction with the troops in McDonough." This was indeed the case, as they were protecting the movement of Hood, with Stewart's corps, and the Georgia Militia who were making their way toward Hardee. Stephen D. Lee's corps, which had been hung up between Atlanta and Jonesboro as Hood debated whether he was needed more in Atlanta or supporting Hardee, was moving into position on the Confederate right. Sherman did not make any attempt to cut off Hood's forces retreating from Atlanta on the 2nd. If he had, he may have prevented the divided forces from reuniting and been able to deal a severe and possibly final blow to the Army of Mississippi. Instead, he hoped that the work on the Confederate defenses was not complete, and that an attack would catch them unprepared (
Castel 1992:521-522, 529-530).
Major J.A. Campbell, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Ohio received word from Union cavalry commander, Colonel Israel Garrard, "Major, I have the honor to report that I went across on to the McDonough and FayetteviiIIe road, striking it between three and four miles from, Lovejoy's Station. Citizens report that infantry from Atlanta, said to be Lee's corps, was moving all the morning, and that the stragglers were still passing when we reached the road. A large wagon train was moving on Thursday night and yesterday to Lovejoy's Station. Last night Ross brigade of cavalry camped just this side of the road, and moved on this morning to Bear Creek Station, below Lovejoy's. The force that moved on the road this morning had artillery. The people speak of there being a great deal of artillery, and of the infantry being very great in quantity, but as near as I could ascertain nook the regular column some three or four hours to pass."
F. A. SHOUP, - Chief of Staff - Report at Lovejoy on SEPTEMBER 2,1864--6.30 p. m.
Lieutenant-General STEWART, Commanding Corps: "From information recently received from General Hardee, and the artillery firing now going on, General Hood thinks it important that you take a very early start in the morning and move to his assistance. Be certain you have good guides, well informed. Do not bear too far north, as it is reported the enemy moved out on the McDonough road from Jonesborough to-day. General Hardee's line of battle crosses the railroad, running east and west, about half a mile in front of Lovejoy's Station. From your present position you should come into the road leading to Lovejoy's at or near Mount Carmel Church, approaching Hardee's position rather from the north. Should he be driven from his position to-night I hope to inform you in time. That would make it necessary for you to move south on the Griffin road." (
OR 50:1016).
On the afternoon of September 2, Sherman ordered Howard on the Union right and Stanley on the left, east of the railroad, to attack the Confederate line. The Union advance pushed the rebels out of their skirmish pits, but the rough ground slowed the progress of the attack. At 4 p.m., Howard received an order from Sherman to call off the attack, as the advantage to be gained was not worth the costs from attacking such a strong position. Stanley did not receive the message, however, and continued to advance. Wood's and Kimball's divisions struggled through "abrupt ascents, deep ravines, treacherous morasses, and the densest jungle," coming within sight of the Confederate works at about 6 p.m. (
OR 1997:1:38:1:384).
